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EVALUATION OF ANTI- POVERTY PROGRAMS’ IMPACT ON JOINT 
DISADVANTAGES: INSIGHTS FROM THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE
by Suman Seth*




Anti- poverty programs increasingly target multiple outcomes to address current and future poverty. 
Conventional evaluation exercises, however, estimate programs’ impact on outcomes separately. We 
present a framework, drawing from the counting approach, that captures the joint distribution of out-
comes and allows evaluating program impact on the distribution of multiple outcomes. We apply the 
framework to analyze the Philippine conditional cash transfer program using an embedded randomized 
control trial survey. We observe that the program induced targeted behavioral changes by reducing over-
all noncompliances to conditionalities, but did not necessarily benefit the poorer families experiencing 
a larger number of simultaneous noncompliances. The overall positive impact is achieved by leaving 
the neediest behind. Our results show the valuable contribution of considering the joint distribution of 
outcomes in evaluating poverty alleviation programs.
JEL Codes: D3, I38, O2
Keywords: conditional cash transfers, joint distribution, multidimensional impact evaluation, 
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1. IntroductIon
Poverty alleviation strategies and programs are a fundamental component 
of  welfare policies in both developed and developing countries. They range 
from a variety of  welfare programs in the US (e.g. see Council of  Economic 
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Advisers, 2018) and strategies for tackling poverty, social exclusion, and social 
immobility in the European countries (OECD, 2007, 2018) to social security 
programs enhancing food and livelihood security in India (Dutta et al., 2014) 
and a multitude of  social safety net programs in developing countries across 
the globe, which include cash transfers, in- kind transfers, social pensions, food 
security, livelihood security, and feeding programs targeted to poorer sections 
of  the population.
Many anti- poverty programs by design target disadvantages on multiple out-
comes simultaneously. Typically, program theories of change rest on addressing 
simultaneous disadvantages to break the inter- generational cycle of poverty. For 
instance, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to tide over families from 
chronic hunger (present poverty), while simultaneously incentivizing access to 
schooling and health care to arrest future poverty (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). Yet, 
conventional program evaluation exercises often examine the impact of a program 
on different outcomes separately and determine that a program is successful if  it 
improves some, if  not all targeted outcomes. Although these exercises are infor-
mative, they do not tell us whether program- induced changes benefited those who 
were initially facing fewer disadvantages or those who were initially facing a larger 
number of disadvantages.
In this paper, we aim to make two key contributions to the literature on pro-
gram evaluation. First, we recast the counting approach framework as an evaluation 
tool to study program impacts on joint multiple outcomes. Second, we evaluate 
the impact of a large CCT program on targeted outcomes and on multidimen-
sional poverty, showing that the framework generates findings and insights that are 
missed by single- outcome evaluation exercises.
The counting framework is particularly useful when the underlying indica-
tors take binary forms, i.e. when each indicator can be categorized into those 
that satisfy an outcome criterion versus those that do not. It is used for devel-
oping various social metrics, such as measures of  social exclusion (Chakravarty 
and D’Ambrosio, 2006), chronic poverty (Foster, 2009), multidimensional pov-
erty (Atkinson, 2003), Alkire and Foster (2011), Bossert et al. (2013), women 
empowerment (Alkire et al., 2013), and vulnerability (Dutta and Mishra, 2018). 
Among these metrics, the multidimensional poverty measures proposed by Alkire 
and Foster (2011) are widely applied (United Nations Development Programme, 
2010; Alkire and Santos, 2010; World Bank, 2018), and there is also a construc-
tive debate surrounding their applications (Ravallion, 2011; Ferreira, 2011; Alkire 
et al., 2011).
Although a number of studies have used multidimensional poverty measures 
to evaluate programs,1 these studies do not formally present how a counting frame-
1For example, Robano and Smith (2013) study the impact of the BRAC ultra poverty program on 
beneficiaries’ multidimensional poverty in Bangladesh; Azevedo and Robles (2013) compare a multidi-
mensional targeting approach to the traditional income- based approach for the Mexico’s opportuni-
dades program; Loschmann et al. (2015) examine whether shelter assistance in Afghanistan reduces 
multidimensional poverty; Pasha (2016) studies the impact of cash grants in South Africa on multidi-
mensional poverty; and Song and Imai (2019) evaluate the short- term impact and long- term sustain-
ability of Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme on multidimensional poverty. For applications of 
counting approaches to poverty targeting and measurement, see Alkire et al. (2015, Chapter 4).
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work can be applied as an evaluation tool to look at a program’s impact on multi-
ple outcomes jointly, where these outcomes may account for behavioral changes, 
deprivations, or any other welfare improvements targeted by the program. In 
Section 2, we formally show that the counting framework is an effective impact 
evaluation instrument in capturing changes to the joint distribution of disadvan-
tages. It uncovers program effects on simultaneous multiple disadvantages while 
still allows for analyzing changes to individual outcomes typical of conventional 
evaluation exercises.
We then use the framework to study the impact of the Philippine CCT pro-
gram. CCTs provide cash grants to beneficiary families conditional on compliance 
with prespecified human capital investments, aimed at inducing targeted behav-
ioral changes (Das et al., 2005). CCTs have gained enormous popularity in recent 
decades as a key social development intervention (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; 
Filmer and Schady, 2011; Baird et al., 2011; Glassman et  al., 2013; Evans and 
Popova, 2017; García and Saavedra, 2017).2 With 4.6 million beneficiaries, the 
Philippine CCT program is one of the largest in the world. The Philippine govern-
ment considers it to be a major contributor to recent poverty reduction, and in 
2019, the program was institutionalized as the country’s flagship poverty reduction 
program through the “Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Act.”
Studies show that the 4Ps improved outcomes— such as school enrolment, 
nutritional status, consumption of food and non- food items, and spending for 
education— and reduced noncompliance rates in different indicators (Onishi et al., 
2013a; Onishi et al., 2013b; Orbeta et al., 2014). However, all studies so far look at 
the program’s impact on outcomes and noncompliances separately. To enrich our 
current understanding, we examine the 4Ps’ impact on the joint distribution of 
outcomes through two separate exercises using a randomized control trial house-
hold survey specifically designed to capture the impact of the program.
Our first evaluation exercise focuses on the binary changes between noncom-
pliances and compliances among program- specified conditionalities and examines 
whether the cash grants induced behavioral changes among beneficiaries by reduc-
ing their joint noncompliances. This exercise looks at the direct intended impact of 
the program. We capture the program’s impact on joint noncompliances by select-
ing five indicators that directly correspond with the 4Ps conditionalities and by 
constructing a multiple noncompliance score, a sum of the beneficiaries’ noncom-
pliances in the selected indicators.
We observe considerable reductions in the incidences of noncompliances 
(i.e., positive impact) in three of the five selected indicators (between 7.8 and 
11.8 percentage points), confirming targeted behavioral changes in these indi-
cators. However, changes in the distribution of multiple noncompliances reveal 
unsatisfactory results. Although the overall average multiple noncompliance score 
improved (a reduction of around 0.051 points on a 0– 1 scale), there are no signif-
icant improvements among families experiencing four or more noncompliances.
Our second exercise investigates whether the program reduced multiple depri-
vations among beneficiary households. This exercise, which complements the 
2For critical evaluations of CCTs, see Baird et al. (2011), Filmer and Schady (2011), and de Janvry 
and Sadoulet (2006).
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
4
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
first one, examines the indirect effect of the program using indicators that are not 
directly conditioned on by the program but still capture different forms of depriva-
tions. Similarly, we construct a multiple deprivation score by counting deprivations 
in the selected indicators. Akin to the impact on joint noncompliances, the 4Ps 
reduced the overall average multiple deprivation score (around 0.024 points on a 
0– 1 scale), and it also improved— albeit in smaller magnitude— the distribution of 
multiple deprivations.
Finally, we explore whether the families with more noncompliances are poorer 
and whether the overall reduction in multiple deprivations is shared by the poorest. 
We find that families with four or more noncompliances experience more depriva-
tions, on average, than the rest of the beneficiaries. Their consumption and savings 
behavior show some progress, but apart from these, we do not observe a strong 
pro- poorest improvement in the joint distribution of deprivations. Thus, despite 
the program’s success in improving various outcomes and noncompliances, the 
program could not be considered inclusive when we look at the joint distribution 
of disadvantages, at least during the early stage covered by the evaluation period.
The Sustainable Development Goals aim to reduce poverty in all its dimen-
sions by year 2030. The heightened emphasis on interconnected solutions to 
poverty must correspondingly give rise to evaluation tools that capture the joint 
distribution of disadvantages. The multidimensional evaluation framework we for-
malized shows how we can enrich the evidence that we build on anti- poverty pro-
grams’ effect on simultaneous disadvantages. Our empirical application highlights 
enhancements to the design and implementation of anti- poverty programs that 
were not apparent from existing evaluations.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We present the counting frame-
work for program evaluation in Section 2. We then present the overview of the 
Philippine CCT program in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the results 
from our two evaluation exercises, respectively. We explore the relationship between 
the distributions of noncompliances and deprivations in Section 6. We provide 
concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Impact eValuatIon from a multIdImenSIonal perSpectIVe
We use the term disadvantage to refer to the inability to satisfy a welfare cri-
terion addressed by a program. For instance, a disadvantage may refer to a non-
compliance, which reflects a failure to satisfy a program- specified condition or a 
deprivation, which reflects the inability to meet a minimum requirement of well- 
being. Let us illustrate how assessing impact on different indicators separately 
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Suppose an anti- poverty program directly targets three indicators. Let the 
three matrices— X, X1, and X2— summarize the disadvantage profiles of four units, 
which may represent individuals or households. In each matrix, a row summarizes 
the disadvantage profile of a unit in three indicators, whereas a column summa-
rizes the disadvantage profile of all units in an indicator. If  a unit fails to meet a 
minimum requirement, the unit experiences a disadvantage (‘D’) in that indicator 
and thus requires intervention. Otherwise, the unit does not experience any disad-
vantage (‘ND’) in that indicator.
Before the program (i.e., in X), within each indicator (i.e. within each column) 
two out of four units experience disadvantages. After the program, one of the two 
alternative disadvantage profiles, X1 and X2, may be obtained from X. The inci-
dence or the proportion of units experiencing disadvantage within each indicator is 
now a quarter, both in X1 and X2. Thus, if  the impact is evaluated for each indicator 
separately, then the program appears to be equally effective, whether X1 or X2 is 
obtained from X.
The difference between the two post- program profiles manifests only when 
we evaluate the program’s impact by considering the three indicators together. In 
X, the first unit does not experience any disadvantage, the second unit experiences 
disadvantage in one indicator, the third unit in two indicators, and the fourth unit 
in all three indicators. Now, X1 is obtained from X by eliminating all three dis-
advantages of the fourth unit, whereas X2 is obtained from X by eliminating the 
disadvantages of the other two units, and leaving the fourth unit unchanged. Thus, 
there may be improvement in each indicator because of the program on average, 
but it may leave out those with simultaneous disadvantages in a larger number of 
indicators— those that should, in fact, be prioritized by the program.
To effectively evaluate a program’s impact on multiple disadvantages, we pres-
ent a framework drawing from the counting approach (Atkinson, 2003; Alkire and 
Foster, 2011). Suppose a program directly targets d ≥ 2 indicators and the target 
population contains n units. Each indicator, by program design, has a disadvantage 
cut- off. When a unit (denoted by i) fails to meet the disadvantage cut- off  of an 
indicator (denoted by j), then unit i experiences disadvantage in indicator j and is 
assigned a binary disadvantage status score of  gij = 1. A score of gij = 0 is assigned 
otherwise. In X, X1 and X2, for instance, a unit is assigned a score of 1 for a status 
of “D” and 0 for a status of “ND.”
The magnitude of multiple disadvantages of a unit is reflected by simply count-
ing its number of disadvantages. A multiple disadvantage score (MDS) for unit i, 





3 Clearly, ci ranges between 0 and d for all 
i and a higher MDS reflects a larger magnitude of disadvantages. An MDS of ci = 0 
means that unit i does not experience disadvantage in any indicator, whereas an 
MDS of ci = d means that unit i simultaneously experiences all d disadvantages.
A program evaluator may be interested in evaluating the program’s impact on 
those that experience k or more disadvantages simultaneously (i.e., ci ≥ k). We may 
refer to k as a disadvantage threshold, which may be determined by the evaluator’s 
3One may consider different disadvantages of unequal importance and weight disadvantages ac-
cordingly. This approach is common in the multidimensional evaluation of well- being and poverty. In 
the case of program evaluation, an evaluator can also incorporate weights to account for the welfare 
implications of different program interventions.
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normative judgment or the implementing agency’s target. For instance, if  they aim 
to capture the impact among all, i.e. those experiencing even one disadvantage, 
then the threshold should be set at k = 1. In contrast, a higher threshold is appro-
priate when the objective is to evaluate the program’s impact on those experiencing 
a larger number of multiple disadvantages.
A straightforward evaluation exercise is to estimate the change in the incidence 
of multiple disadvantages or the incidence of experiencing k or more disadvantages. 
Let us denote the incidence of multiple disadvantages for a given disadvantage 
threshold k by:
where  [ci ≥ k ] is an indicator function with a value of 1 for ci ≥ k and 0 otherwise, 
and qk is the number of units experiencing k or more disadvantages. Clearly, the 
incidence is bounded between 0 and 1. A reduction in H reflects a positive program 
impact.
An impact evaluation exercise based only on comparing incidences, however, 
ignores any change in the intensity or multiplicity of disadvantages among those 
that experience k or more disadvantages.4 A simple way to reflect the intensity of 
multiple disadvantages may be to look at the average MDS of those experiencing k 
or more disadvantages:
By construction, A is bounded between k and d. The lower bound, k, is 
reached when all qk units experience exactly k disadvantages. The upper bound, d, 
is reached either (a) when all qk units experience d disadvantages simultaneously, 
or (b) when we are interested in those that experience all d disadvantages (i.e. k = d) 
and one or more units have such an experience.
Let us illustrate why an impact evaluation exercise should include intensity in 
addition to the incidence of multiple disadvantages. Suppose, deprivation profile 
X3 is obtained from X by alleviating one disadvantage for the fourth unit. A pol-
icy evaluation exercise that focuses on those with two or more disadvantages (i.e. 
k = 2) would reveal no program impact if  the exercise merely compares incidences, 
because two units in both X and X3 experience two or more disadvantages. Yet, the 
intensity of those experiencing two or more disadvantages (third and fourth units) 
decreased from 2.5 in X to 2 in X3. The program did not reduce the incidence of 
two or more disadvantages, but it commendably reduced one disadvantage for the 
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Changes in both incidence and intensity of multiple disadvantages may be 
captured by the following measure, motivated by the adjusted head count ratio 
(Alkire and Foster, 2011):
where  [ci ≥ k ] is an indicator function. Measure M is a product of both incidence 
and intensity of multiple disadvantages divided by the number of indicators. The 
maximum feasible number of disadvantages is n × d, which occurs when all n units 
experience d disadvantages. The minimum feasible number of disadvantages is 
zero, which occurs when every unit experiences strictly less than k disadvantages. 
Intuitively, M captures the mass of multiple disadvantages by counting the MDSs 




ci ×  [ci ≥ k ]), normalized by the 
maximum feasible number of disadvantages (i.e., n × d). Alternatively, M may be 
interpreted as an average of the censored normalized MDSs, i.e., (ci ×  [ci ≥ k ] ) ∕d. 
Like H, M is bounded between 0 and 1. When the disadvantage threshold is k = d, 
the identity M (d) =H(d ) holds.
Our primary outcome measure for multidimensional impact evaluation is M, 
but we also analyze the changes in H and A to examine how the overall change 
in M is accomplished. Studying this breakdown has useful policy implications. A 
program that eliminates disadvantages among those experiencing lower MDSs will 
show a reduction in M that is mainly driven by a reduction in H. On the contrary, 
if  the program primarily eliminates disadvantages among those with high MDSs 
but do not necessarily bring their MDSs below k, then the reduction in M will 
be driven by a reduction in A. To facilitate our understanding, recall our illustra-
tion involving X,X1 and X2. Suppose, k = 2. The pre- program mass, incidence, and 
intensity for X are 5/12, 1/2, and 5/6, respectively. For X1, they are 1/6, 1/4, and 2/3, 
respectively. Thus, a 60 percent reduction in M is accompanied by a 50 percent 
reduction in H and a 20 percent reduction in A. Let us now look at X2, where the 
mass, incidence, and intensity are 1/4, 1/4, and 1, respectively. Unfortunately, in this 
case, the 40 percent reduction in M is accompanied by a 50 percent reduction in H, 
but a 20 percent increase in A.
Our illustration above uses a particular disadvantage threshold k. The use of a 
range of thresholds, however, is helpful when evaluating a program’s impact on the 
distribution of multiple disadvantages. The concept is analogous to poverty domi-
nance (Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988; Ravallion, 1994; Alkire et al., 
2015). Let us go back to X, X1, and X2. If  we consider the deprivation threshold to 
be k = 1, then three units in X experience one or more disadvantages and the pre- 
program mass is 1/2. In X1, two units experience one or more disadvantages and the 
associated post- program mass is 1/4. The post- program mass in X2 is also 1/4. In 
both cases, the program has reduced the masses by 50 percent. However, for k = 3, the 
program exhibits a positive impact when X1 is obtained from X, but does not show 
any change when X2 is obtained from X. Therefore, with X2, the program cannot 
be considered inclusive because the unit with the greatest need did not benefit from 
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3. the program, data, and econometrIc analySIS
The Philippine CCT program (4Ps) is the government’s flagship poverty 
reduction strategy and human capital investment program. The program’s primary 
objectives are to: (a) improve preventive health care among pregnant women and 
young children; (b) raise school enrollment and attendance rates among children; 
(c) reduce the incidence of child labor; and (d) raise the average food consumption 
expenditure of poor households (DSWD, 2012). Cash grants, which are provided 
upon fulfilling the required conditionalities, are expected to assist beneficiary 
households to achieve these objectives.
Program components described here are those applicable for the period 
covered in this evaluation study— 2008– 2011 (Fernandez and Olfindo, 2011). 
Beneficiary households get two types of cash grants, released every 2 months: the 
education grant and the health grant. The education grant is  300 per month or  
3000 per year for each school- age children of 14 years or younger, for a maximum 
of three beneficiary children per household. At the time of data collection, the 
exchange rate is approximately US$1 =  45. The education grant is expected to 
cover schooling expenses and to compensate families for possible income losses 
because of the schooling conditionality.
The health grant is 500 per month or 6000 per year. All beneficiary house-
holds are entitled to this grant, which aims to improve food consumption. The 
maximum overall grant for each household is thus 15,000 per year. This amount is 
around 15 percent of the income poverty line when 4Ps was initiated in treatment 
areas. Based on the 4Ps grants data, the average annual grants received by treat-
ment households between January 2009 and November 2011 is 9022. Actual grants 
received depend on household composition and compliance to program condition-
alities listed in Table 1. The 4Ps followed a phased- in implementation design. Areas 
with the highest incidence of poverty based on 2006 poverty statistics were priori-
tized in 2008. By 2010, 4Ps was initiated in all provinces. Beneficiary households are 
identified as follows. First, a household is identified as poor if  its predicted income, 
estimated through proxy means test (PMT), falls below the required poverty 
threshold.5 Then, a poor household is identified as eligible if  it has either at least 
one child aged 0– 14 years or a pregnant member. Finally, eligible households are 
invited to a village assembly for information validation and to formalize program 
enlistment. In sum, beneficiary households: (1) reside in areas selected for the pro-
gram; (2) are identified as poor through PMT; (3) have either children aged 0– 14 
years or a pregnant member; and (4) are validated eligible during a village 
assembly.
The Philippine government considers the 4Ps to be a major contributor to 
recent poverty reduction. It is claimed to have increased the average income among 
the bottom three deciles of the population by 82 percent and have reduced monetary 
poverty incidence from 26.3 percent to 21.6 percent between 2009 and 2015 (NEDA, 
2017). Program evaluation reports show that the program improved outcomes 
5Because of inherent difficulties in collecting income data directly, a PMT uses multivariate regres-
sion techniques to estimate incomes using correlate proxy indicators. The first wave of household list-
ing, conducted between 2007 and 2011, identified 5.25 million of 10.9 million households as poor (see 
Fernandez, 2012).
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and reduced noncompliance rates in different indicators. Onishi, Friedman and 
Chaudhury (2013a), for instance, find positive impacts on school enrollment of 
3- to 11- year- old children and on nutritional status of 6- to 36- month- old children. 
Similarly, Onishi, Kandpal, Friedman and Chaudhury (2013b) detect increases 
in the consumption of food and non- food items. Meanwhile, Orbeta, Abdon, del 
Mundo, Tutor, Valera and Yarcia (2014) observe improvements in school enroll-
ment among 12- to 15- year- old children, in deliveries in health facilities, and in 
spending for education.
3.1. Data and Experimental Design
Admirably, the 4Ps is one of the few nationwide programs with an embedded 
impact evaluation design. Since 2011, three waves of impact evaluation surveys 
have been conducted to evaluate the program’s causal impacts on health, edu-
cation, and poverty outcomes. Each wave collects samples for both randomized 
TABLE 1  




Education Children 3– 14 
years old
Enroll in school and maintain a class attendance rate 
of at least 85% per month
Health Children 0– 14 
years old
For children 0– 5 years old:
• Complete all required vaccinations
• Monthly weight monitoring and nutrition 
counseling for children aged 0– 23 months old; 
bi- monthly for 24– 72 months old
For children 6– 14 years old in elementary level:
• Complete all required vaccinations
• Monthly weight monitoring and nutrition 
counseling for children aged 0– 23 months old; 
bi- monthly for 24– 72 months old
Pregnant women Need to satisfy all the following criteria:
• One pre- natal consultation each trimester
• At least one blood pressure and weight monitor-
ing measurement in each trimester
• At least one Breastfeeding Counseling Session 
prior to delivery and within the first six weeks 
after childbirth
• At least one Family Planning Counseling 
Session prior to delivery and within the first six 
weeks after childbirth
• Delivery by a skilled health professional
• At least one post- natal care within the first six 
weeks after childbirth
Mother or other 
designated 
guardian
Attend monthly Family Development Sessions (lec-
tures on nutrition, sanitation, reproductive health, 
responsible parenthood, among others)
Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development (2012). Pantawid Pamilya Operations 
Manual.
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control trial (RCT) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) evaluation. In this 
paper, we use only the first wave of the RCT evaluation survey. We prefer an RCT 
survey over an RDD survey because the latter only captures localized treatment 
effect and may miss the program’s impact on the households in greatest need of 
intervention. Meanwhile, since the second wave of the RCT survey, control house-
holds have been incorporated into the program.
The RCT survey follows a cluster randomized trial design, where treatment 
assignment is determined at the village level. In October 2008, eight municipalities 
are chosen to represent the poorest municipalities in the poorest provinces, and 130 
clusters or villages are randomly drawn from these municipalities. Half  of these 
villages are assigned to treatment. Program implementation in treatment areas 
commenced in January 2009, and the first wave of impact evaluation survey is car-
ried out between October and November 2011. A total of 1418 sample households 
are surveyed— 704 from treatment and 714 from control villages.6 Treatment 
assignment is credibly implemented as there are no households from the control 
villages that received 4Ps benefits based on the beneficiary database.7Meanwhile, 8 
percent of sample households in treatment areas are not 4Ps beneficiaries. Possibly, 
these households did not participate in the community assembly, where eligible 
beneficiaries confirm their information and register for the program. Alternatively, 
they may have opted out of the program or were dropped from the list of eligible 
households during community validation as inclusion errors (Onishi et al., 2013a).
Ideally, all sample households in the RCT survey should have PMT incomes 
below the respective provincial poverty thresholds and should have at least one 
program- eligible member. We observe, however, that around 9 percent of the sam-
ple households in the survey do not have any program- eligible member, potentially 
because of changes in household composition between the time of the household 
assessment in 2008 and the time of the first wave survey in 2011. There is no sys-
tematic difference between the treatment and control groups on the proportion 
of households without a program- eligible member. These households are dropped 
from the analysis.
3.2. Econometric Specification and Experimental Validity
Actual program status may be affected by realities on the ground, such as 
self- selection and other program implementation challenges. For our analysis, the 
eligible households residing in treatment villages are considered as treated regard-
less of actual program status and the eligible households in control villages are 
considered as controls. In the literature, this approach is referred to as estimating 
intent- to- treatment (ITT) effect, or the average potential impact of offering the pro-
gram, which captures the change in outcomes among the eligible households given 
the opportunity to participate.
Our unit of analysis is the household and we estimate the causal impact of the 
4Ps using the following regression specification:
6A power analysis conducted in Onishi, Friedman and Chaudhury (2013a) on three outcome 
variables— monthly per capita household consumption, school participation on 6- to 14- year- old chil-
dren, and health facility visits of 0- to 5- year- old children— shows that a sample of 1300 is sufficient to 
detect impact with 80 percent power.
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where yi is the outcome variable for household i, pi is the binary program assign-
ment such that pi = 1 if  household i resides in treatment areas and pi = 0 otherwise, 
 estimates the program’s ITT effect, xi is a vector of covariates that we control and 
i is the error term. A negative estimated value of  reflects an improvement in the 
outcome variable and vice versa.
For estimating the impact on the intensity (A) or the average MDS of those 
experiencing k or more disadvantages, we use the following regression specification:
where zi is a binary variable taking a value of 1 whenever the MDS is larger than 
k and a value of 0 otherwise and pi is the binary program assignment. Please note 
that we add an interaction term combining zi and pi. The program’s impact on the 
intensity is estimated from Equation 5 as:
We conduct balance tests to check the credibility of the randomization and 
indeed we do not find any significant differences in the baseline characteristics 
between treatment and control groups (results are available in Supplementary 
Tables A1 and A2. As a full baseline survey is not available, we can only test demo-
graphics and household characteristics that are used to compute the PMT incomes. 
We find no reason to doubt that potential outcomes are not independent of treat-
ment assignment. The PMT formula, used for identifying the poor, is not released 
to the public. The program’s poverty thresholds are also set by the national statis-
tics agency and not by the program implementer.
4. effectIVeneSS of the 4pS In InducIng behaVIoral changeS
In our first exercise, we examine whether the 4Ps has induced behavioral 
changes or reduced noncompliances vis- a- vis the program conditionalities. Several 
studies have examined the impact of the 4Ps on noncompliance rates for differ-
ent indicators separately, but none has looked at the program’s impact on joint 
noncompliances.
4.1. Noncompliance Indicators and Sample Selection
The indicators are drawn from the program’s conditionalities listed in Table 1. 
Ideally, we ought to incorporate all conditionalities in our analysis, but our selec-
tion of indicators is constrained by our study objective as well as by the availability 
of data. For instance, we cannot include the information on family development 
sessions because the information is only applicable to households assigned to treat-
ment. Similarly, we cannot use the information on certain conditionalities for preg-
nant women— such as monitoring sessions for blood pressure and weight and 







(6)  =E(y ∣ z=1, p=1)−E(y ∣ z=1, p=0)=2+3.
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monitored separately for compliance (only visits to the health center were moni-
tored). Finally, we are unable to include immunization and postnatal care because 
of missing data issues.7
Another challenge that we encounter among the remaining conditionalities 
is that the applicable populations are not uniform. For example, the education 
conditionalities are applicable to 3- to 14- year- old children, whereas the health 
conditionalities are applicable to 0- to 14- year- old children as well as to pregnant 
women. We included at least one indicator from each of the relevant target popu-
lations: school- age children (3– 14 years old), 0- to 5- year- old children, and women 
of reproductive age. Given that each conditionality has respective applicable pop-
ulation, it is understandably not feasible for all households in our sample to have 
program- eligible member(s) for every conditionality.
We can select only five indicators that are directly targeted by the program. 
Table 2 presents the indicators and the noncompliance criteria. The applicable pop-
ulations for the first three indicators are children of different age groups, whereas 
the applicable population for the final two indicators is women of reproductive age 
(i.e. 15– 49 years old). Information on prenatal visit or birth delivery is available for 
female household members who are currently pregnant and have given a live birth 
in the past 5 years. However, considering the program’s exposure from January 
2009 to September 2011, we only consider births that are delivered from October 
2009 onward. Therefore, to be included in the analysis, a child’s growth must have 
been potentially “covered” by the program from the time of conception— a critical 
period in the child’s development (UNICEF, 2014).
The challenge of nonoverlapping applicable populations also entails a crucial 
trade- off. Note that our multidimensional evaluation exercise requires us to look 
at households’ noncompliance profiles across indicators jointly. Yet, only 25 per-
cent of sample households have at least one program- eligible member for the birth 
delivery indicator, whereas 98 percent have at least one member for the attendance 
7Vaccination details are particularly challenging to recall and are taken from immunization cards, 
which are presented for only around 24 percent of 0- to 5- year- old children. The postnatal care indica-
tor suffers from similar significant missing data issues.
TABLE 2  
IndIcatorS and noncomplIance crIterIa for StudyIng the 4pS’ Impact on multIple 
noncomplIanceS
Indicator Noncompliance Criterion (Household Level)
Attendance Household has at least one 3- to 14- year- old child with attendance 
rate below 85 percent
Health visit Household has at least one 0- to 5- year- old child who did not have 
regular growth and nutrition monitoring visits
Deworming Household has at least one 6- to 14- year- old child in elementary who 
did not receive two deworming pills
Prenatal visit Household has at least one woman (currently pregnant or had live 
birth in the past 2 years) not having prescribed number of prenatal 
visit
Birth delivery Household has any live birth in the past 2 years, but the birth is either 
not delivered in a health facility or by a health professional
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
13
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
indicator (the distribution of the number of eligible members per indicator among 
the 1290 sample households may be found in Supplementary Table A3).
Therefore, we may either restrict our attention to sample households with eli-
gible members for all five selected indicators or we may consider all sample house-
holds with eligible member(s) in at least one indicator. The former option leads to a 
sample of merely 243 households, which severely reduces the statistical power and 
representativeness of our analysis. The choice of indicators with nonoverlapping 
applicable populations follows naturally from the design of the 4Ps intervention and 
is thus unavoidable.
To elucidate the loss of representativeness, we divide the sample containing 
all households with eligible member(s) in at least one indicator (Sample A) into a 
sample of households with eligible member(s) in at least one but fewer than five 
indicators (Sample B) and a sample of households with eligible members in all five 
indicators (Sample C). In Panel I of Table 3, we present the incidences of non-
compliances of all five indicators within each sample, where the only statistically 
significant difference between Sample B and Sample C is observed for the atten-
dance indicator. In Panel II, we present the distribution of households experiencing 
different numbers of noncompliances within each sample, where the distribution 
for Sample C is vastly different from the distribution of Sample B and thus from 
Sample A. Thus, we conduct our primary analysis on the entire sample of 1290 
households (Sample A), but we also verify the robustness of our findings for the 
sample of 243 households (Sample C).
Considering the entire sample of 1290 households allows us to capture the 
impact of 4Ps without losing representativeness, but implicitly treats a household 
without any eligible member in an indicator to be compliant in that indicator. This 
approach is common for cross- country and inter- temporal comparisons in multidi-
mensional poverty analysis (See, United Nations Development Programme, 2010; 
Alkire and Santos, 2014; Alkire et al., 2017). It is infeasible for every household, 
TABLE 3  
proportIon of houSeholdS wIth noncomplIanceS by Sample typeS
Sample A Sample B Sample C B – C
Panel I: Incidence of non- compliance per indicator
Attendance 1,266 0.398 1,023 0.377 243 0.486 −0.108***
Health visit 752 0.763 509 0.747 243 0.798 −0.052
Deworming 1,104 0.645 861 0.639 243 0.667 −0.028
Prenatal 394 0.393 151 0.444 243 0.362 0.082
Birth delivery 322 0.677 79 0.646 243 0.687 −0.042
Panel II: Distribution of households by their number of non- compliances
No non- compliance 1,290 0.178 1,047 0.215 243 0.021 0.194***
One non- compliance 1,290 0.316 1,047 0.370 243 0.082 0.287***
Two non- compliances 1,290 0.264 1,047 0.266 243 0.251 0.015
Three non- compliances 1,290 0.160 1,047 0.129 243 0.296 −0.167***
Four non- compliances 1,290 0.058 1,047 0.020 243 0.222 −0.202***
Five non- compliances 1,290 0.024 1,047 0.000 243 0.128 −0.128***
Note: Under column headings Sample A, Sample B, and Sample C, the left sub- column reports the 
numbers of sample households and the right sub- column reports the proportions of households. The 
final column (B– C) reports the differences of proportions between Sample B and Sample C and their 
statistical significance. ***p < 0. 01, **p < 0. 05, *p < 0. 1. Source: Authors’ own computations.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
14
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
under this option, to be noncompliant in all five indicators, which may be crucial 
when targeting households by affecting inter- household comparability. As we do 
not conduct any targeting exercise, such comparability is not a concern for our 
analysis.
Given that a larger number of program- eligible members may make a house-
hold more likely to experience noncompliances in a larger number of indicators, 
we control for the number of 4Ps- eligible members at baseline when estimating the 
program’s impact on each outcome.
In Table 4, considering a noncompliance as a disadvantage, we present descrip-
tive statistics on unconditional noncompliance rates for all five indicators (Panel I) 
as well as the masses of multiple noncompliances (Panel II) for the overall sample, 
the treatment sample, and the control sample. The sample of treatment households 
has statistically lower unconditional noncompliance rates for three indicators— 
attendance, health visit, and deworming. Unconditional masses of multiple non-
compliances also appear to be significantly lower among the treated households 
for the noncompliance thresholds of k = 1, 2, 3. The cross- tabulation of noncom-
pliances across five indicators for the overall, treated, and control samples is avail-
able in Supplementary Table A4.
4.2. Impact on Multiple Noncompliances
We now estimate the program’s impact on the masses of multiple noncompli-
ances for different noncompliance thresholds (k). Our main outcome variable is 
the censored normalized multiple noncompliance score, i.e. yi = ci∕d if  ci ≥ k and 
yi = 0 if  ci < k in terms of the notation in Equation 4. We also estimate the pro-
gram’s impact on the incidence of noncompliances for different indicators as well 
as the incidence of multiple noncompliances for different k values.
TABLE 4  
proportIon of houSeholdS wIth noncomplIanceS per IndIcator and the JoInt dIStrIbutIon of 
noncomplIanceS acroSS treatment and control groupS
Overall Control Treatment Difference
Panel I: Incidence of non- compliance per indicator
Attendance 1,266 0.398 635 0.454 631 0.342 −0.111***
Health visit 752 0.763 371 0.833 381 0.696 −0.137***
Deworming 1,104 0.645 553 0.685 551 0.604 −0.081**
Prenatal 394 0.393 195 0.431 199 0.357 −0.074
Birth delivery 322 0.677 157 0.682 165 0.673 −0.009
Panel II: Distribution of joint non- compliances
M (k = 1 ) 1,290 0.335 649 0.360 641 0.311 −0.049***
M (k = 2 ) 1,290 0.272 649 0.300 641 0.245 −0.055***
M (k = 3 ) 1,290 0.167 649 0.191 641 0.142 −0.049**
M (k = 4 ) 1,290 0.071 649 0.075 641 0.066 −0.008
M (k = 5 ) 1,290 0.024 649 0.022 641 0.027 0.005
Note: Under column headings Overall, Control, and Treatment, the left sub- column reports the 
numbers of sample households and the right sub- column reports the proportions of households. The 
final column (Difference) reports the unconditional differences in proportions between treatment and 
control households and their statistical significance. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Source: Authors’ 
own computations.
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Each outcome variable for evaluating the impact on incidences is a binary 
variable, such that yi = 1 if  household i experiences noncompliance (or experiences 
multiple noncompliances in the case of H) and yi = 0 otherwise. Estimating impact 
on incidences using Equation 4 is equivalent to using linear probability models. We 
test the robustness of our findings by computing marginal effects through probabi-
listic models and we arrive at similar analytic conclusions.
The top- half  of Table 5 presents the estimated impacts on the incidence of 
noncompliance for the five indicators, and the bottom- half  of the table presents 
the estimates on the masses of multiple noncompliances (M) for different non-
compliance thresholds (k). We additionally report the estimated impacts on the 
incidences (H) and intensities (A) of multiple noncompliances (using Equations 5 
and 6).
A block of four rows in each column corresponds to an outcome. The first 
row within each block denotes the causal impact estimate, and the other three rows 
report the 90 percent confidence interval of the estimate (square brackets), the 
counterfactual mean (parentheses), and the corresponding sample size (angular 
brackets), respectively. The sample size for each indicator corresponds to the num-
ber of households with eligible members in that indicator. We control for household 
TABLE 5  
eStImateS of 4pS’ Impact on noncomplIanceS for houSeholdS wIth elIgIble member(S) In at leaSt 
one IndIcator
Attendance Health visit Deworming Prenatal Birth delivery
- 0.115*** - 0.118*** - 0.078*** - 0.073 - 0.028
[−0.163, −0.066] [−0.176, −0.061] [−0.125, −0.030] [−0.153, 0.007] [−0.120, 0.063]
(0.454) (0.833) (0.685) (0.431) (0.682)
⟨1, 266 ⟩ ⟨752 ⟩ ⟨1, 104 ⟩ ⟨394 ⟩ ⟨322 ⟩
Estimates of impact on the joint- distribution of non- compliances
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
M - 0.051*** - 0.059*** - 0.052*** - 0.010 0.005
[−0.073, −0.029] [−0.084, −0.034] [−0.078, −0.026] [−0.033, 0.013] [−0.009, 0.018]
(0.360) (0.300) (0.191) (0.075) (0.022)
⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩
H - 0.061*** - 0.102*** - 0.084*** - 0.013
[−0.097, −0.024] [−0.145, −0.059] [−0.120, −0.047] [−0.040, 0.013]
(0.854) (0.553) (0.282) (0.088)
⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩
A - 0.170*** - 0.039 0.117 0.099
[−0.268, −0.073] [−0.150, 0.071] [−0.027, 0.261] [−0.038, 0.236]
(2.106) (2.708) (3.388) (4.246)
⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩
Note: A block of four rows presents the results for each outcome. In each column and in the first 
row of each block, the impact estimate denotes the intent- to- treat effect. For each impact estimate, we 
show the the 90% confidence interval (square brackets), the control mean (parenthesis), and the number 
of observations (angular brackets). Baseline control variables include household head’s age and com-
pleted years of education, and the number of program- eligible members. Additional village- level con-
trols (from the impact evaluation but not baseline survey) are the numbers of grade- and high schools, 
number of doctors and midwives, and the presence of a health center in the village. All regressions 
control for municipality level fixed effects and standard errors are robust to clustering at the village 
level. M and H range between 0 and 1, but A ranges between k and 5. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
. Source: Authors’ own computations.
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characteristics, municipality- level fixed- effects, and village- level variables (supply- 
side factors) that may affect the variability of the outcomes.
The program significantly improved three child- related indicators— 
attendance, health visit, and deworming, of  magnitudes 11.5, 11.8, and 7.3 per-
centage points, respectively. The health visit and deworming indicators are highly 
program- specific, and therefore positive impacts show that the conditionalities are 
effective in inducing household behavioral changes. We are unable, however, to sta-
tistically detect changes in the incidences of noncompliances for the prenatal and 
birth delivery indicators.
In the bottom- half  of Table 5, we present the program’s impact on the masses 
of multiple noncompliances. Overall, when we consider the households with one 
or more noncompliances (k = 1), we observe that the mass decreased statistically 
significantly by 0.051 points or by 14.2 percent. Decomposing the mass across the 
incidence and intensity of multiple noncompliances, we observe that the reduction 
in the mass is accompanied by a reduction in the incidence from 85.4 percent by 6.1 
percentage- points. At the same time, the intensity of multiple noncompliances of 
those experiencing one or more noncompliances is lower by 0.17 points on average, 
which is equivalent to slightly less than one- fifth of an indicator.
A reduction in M is certainly a positive finding, but to look at the effect on 
the distribution of multiple noncompliances, let us examine the changes in masses 
for other thresholds. Masses for k = 2 and k = 3 improved significantly by 0.059 
and 0.052 points or by 19.7 percent and 27.2 percent, respectively. These reduc-
tions are accompanied by even larger magnitudes of decreases in corresponding 
incidences, where the proportions of households with two or more and three or 
more noncompliances are lower by 10.2 and 8.4 percentage- points, respectively. 
In contrast, the corresponding intensities or the average noncompliance did not 
fall. These contrasting findings may suggest that the reductions in masses for k = 2 
and k = 3 are obtained by alleviating noncompliances among those with two or 
three noncompliances while leaving the compliance profiles of those experiencing 
a larger number of noncompliances unchanged.
Our conjecture is supported by the findings for k = 4 and k = 5. Even though 
the mass is lower by 13.3 percent for k = 4, this reduction is not statistically signifi-
cant. The reduction in the corresponding incidence is also around 18 percent relative 
to the initial level, but the magnitude of the reduction in absolute term is less than a 
quarter compared to the reductions for k = 1, 2, and 3. A similar narrative unfolds 
for k = 5, where it is sufficient to interpret the change in the mass as M =H, but 
the number of sample households with five noncompliances is not sufficient for a 
meaningful evaluation.
We thus observe a partial positive impact of the 4Ps on multiple noncom-
pliances. The program reduced noncompliances among households with three or 
fewer noncompliances by inducing desired behavioral changes through cash and 
conditionalities. The program, nevertheless, does not appear to improve the aver-
age condition of households experiencing more noncompliances.
We present two robustness exercises in Supplementary Tables A5 and A6. 
Looking at the impact estimates based on the 243 sample households with eligible 
members in all five indicators, we observe that the absolute reduction in the mass 
for k = 4 is less than one- third of the absolute reduction in the mass for k = 3 and 
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
17
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
is around half  of the absolute reductions in the masses for both k = 1 and k = 2 
(Supplementary Table A5). Most estimates are, however, statistically insignificant 
because of low statistical power, which we verified through inverse power analysis 
(Andrews, 1989). We also estimate the average treatment effect on the treated using 
the program information on actual beneficiary status of the households. None 
of the eligible households in control areas received treatment, but around 6 per-
cent of the sample treatment households did not participate in the program. Our 
treatment- on- treated estimates (Supplementary Table A6) are consistent with our 
intent- to- treat estimates.
5. effectIVeneSS of the 4pS In reducIng poVerty
In our second exercise, we look at the program’s contribution to reducing 
multidimensional poverty by assessing its impact on the incidences and joint dis-
tribution of selected deprivation indicators. Although there is a healthy debate sur-
rounding the particular forms of multidimensional poverty measures (Ravallion, 
2011; Alkire et al., 2011), the value of understanding the joint distribution of depri-
vations is considered crucial (Ferreira, 2011). As before, we use the counting frame-
work and use both monetary and non- monetary indicators. Here, a deprivation is 
considered as a disadvantage. The mass of multiple deprivations is the adjusted 
head count ratio (Alkire and Foster, 2011), which is a product of the incidence 
and the intensity of multiple deprivations, divided by the number of indicators. To 
distinguish the notation in this section from that used in Section 4, we denote the 
mass and the incidence of multiple deprivations by M ′ and H ′, respectively, and the 
threshold or the poverty cut- off by k ′.
5.1. Deprivation Indicators
We select five indicators, chiefly based on three considerations. First, the 
selected indicators are related to program objectives, but are not directly targeted 
by the 4Ps’ conditionalities. Second, each indicator can reflect changes in depri-
vations over a relatively short period, i.e. between January 2009 and October/
November 2011. Unfortunately, deprivations in many indicators— such as access 
to public services or adult education— are crucial, but they remain static over a 
short period. Third, to circumvent potential endogeneity issues, we avoid indica-
tors that are used for constructing PMT incomes that, in turn, are used to deter-
mine program eligibility.
In Table 6, we list the selected indicators and their deprivation criteria, where 
a household is considered deprived in an indicator if  it fails to meet a subsis-
tence standard or deprivation criterion. The first indicator is consumption, which 
is aligned with the program’s objective of raising the average food consumption 
through health grants. The indicator identifies a household as deprived if  the 
household’s total consumption expenditure is so low that it is not even sufficient to 
cover the minimum subsistence level of food expenditure. Around 47.5 percent of 
households in the control group are deprived in this indicator.
We complement the consumption indicator with two additional indicators— 
hunger and nutrition. The hunger indicator aims to capture the household’s 
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deprivation in the availability of food. Each household was asked about the num-
ber of occurrences in the past 3 months when they experienced hunger and did not 
have anything to eat. A household is deprived if  it experienced such a situation 
in more than one occasion. We avoid considering “one occasion of hunger” as a 
reflection of potential deprivation because a single occurrence may be because of 
recall issues or other external shocks unrelated to deprivation.
The nutrition indicator captures direct health deprivation within the house-
hold through child undernourishment assessed using the World Health 
Organization’s growth standards on weight- for- age.8 We do not observe strong 
overlaps between these three indicators, which indicate that they are capturing dif-
ferent aspects of deprivation in this particular context. In addition, in Supplementary 
Table A7, we present the proportion of households deprived in each of the five 
indicators as well as the proportion of households deprived simultaneously in each 
pair of indicators.
The fourth indicator— dropout— may appear to be the same as the attendance 
indicator that we use in Section 4, but it is not directly targeted by program con-
ditionalities. The program has a rather stricter criterion, which requires not only 
a child to be enrolled (the complement of dropout), but also at least 85 percent 
attendance rate. Moreover, a household receives education grants for only a maxi-
mum number of three children. Every household is not necessarily aware which of 
their children are targeted, and the program also does not prevent households from 
using the grant to enroll all their children.
The fifth indicator— savings— aims to reflect financial deprivation and iden-
tifies a household as deprived if  it does not have a savings account or any other 
savings instrument, such as provident fund, life insurance, or pre- need insur-
ance. Maintaining a savings account aims to help beneficiaries smoothen their 
8An alternative well- known indicator is height- for- age or stunting, which effectively reflects cumu-
lative effect of chronic under- nutrition not only since birth but also since conception. Therefore, we 
consider the weight- for- age indicator to be more suitable for studying the effect of the program within 
a shorter horizon.
TABLE 6  
IndIcatorS and deprIVatIon crIterIa for StudyIng 4pS’ Impact on deprIVatIonS
Indicator Deprivation Criterion (Household Level)
Consumption Household’s total consumption expenditure is lower than the food 
poverty line
Hunger Household members had experienced hunger in more than one 
occasion in the past 3 months
Nutrition Household has at least one 0- to 5- year- old child, whose weight- 
for- age is two standard deviations lower than the median child 
growth standards
Dropout Household has at least one 3- to 14- year- old child, who is not at-
tending school
Savings Household does not have a savings account or any other financial 
instrument
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consumption or to open opportunities for other financial or enterprise assistance, 
both of which can lead to welfare improvement.
In Table 7, we present the unconditional deprivation rates for all five indi-
cators (Panel I) and the masses of multiple deprivations (Panel II) for the overall 
sample, the treatment sample, and the control sample. We observe that treatment 
households have statistically lower unconditional deprivation rate only for the 
dropout indicator. Similarly, the unconditional mass of multiple deprivations is sig-
nificantly lower among the treated households only for the deprivation threshold 
of k � = 3.
5.2. Impact on Multiple Deprivations
We now examine the program’s causal impact on multidimensional poverty 
using the same sample of 1290 households with at least one program- eligible mem-
ber. We use the regression specification in Equation 4 to estimate the causal impact 
of the 4Ps and the primary outcomes of interest are deprivation incidences of  the 
indicators in Table 6 and the masses of multiple deprivations for different poverty 
cut- offs. The counting framework allows incorporating welfare weights to evaluate 
changes in joint deprivations, but we do not have such information available set 
by the program. The set of controls includes selected household characteristics, 
municipality- level fixed- effects and village- level characteristics.
In the top- half  of Table 8, we report impact estimates on deprivation inci-
dences of the five indicators. Interpretations of the components in the table are the 
same as that in Table 5. The program’s impact on deprivation incidences for four 
of the five indicators (consumption, hunger, underweight, and savings) is small 
and statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant positive impact is 
observed for the dropout indicator. The underweight indicator somehow reflects a 
negative impact. Our overall finding about consumption deprivation is consistent 
TABLE 7  
proportIon of houSeholdS wIth deprIVatIon per IndIcator and the JoInt dIStrIbutIon of 
deprIVatIon acroSS treatment and control groupS
Overall Control Treatment Difference
Panel I: Incidence of deprivation per indicator
Consumption 1,290 0.478 649 0.476 641 0.480 0.004
Hunger 1,290 0.172 649 0.185 641 0.159 −0.026
Underweight 716 0.365 349 0.350 367 0.379 0.029
Dropout 1,266 0.241 635 0.285 631 0.197 −0.089***
Savings 1,290 0.856 649 0.866 641 0.846 −0.020
Panel II: Distribution of joint deprivations
M
� (k � = 1 ) 1,290 0.389 649 0.399 641 0.379 −0.020
M
� (k � = 2 ) 1,290 0.331 649 0.341 641 0.320 −0.021
M
� (k � = 3 ) 1,290 0.190 649 0.210 641 0.169 −0.040*
M
� (k � = 4 ) 1,290 0.074 649 0.087 641 0.062 −0.025
M
� (k � = 5 ) 1,290 0.012 649 0.014 641 0.009 −0.005
Note: Under column headings Overall, Control, and Treatment, the left sub- column reports the 
numbers of sample households and the right sub- column reports the proportions of households. The 
final column (Difference) reports the unconditional differences in proportions between treatment and 
control households and their statistical significance. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Source: Authors’ 
own computations.
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with that of Onishi et al. (2013a), who also did not observe program impacts on 
consumption for the same period. Changes in consumption may potentially take 
more time to manifest, which was observed in case of the Mexico’s CCT program 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).
Does 4Ps exhibit a positive impact on the joint deprivations? In the lower- half  
of Table 8, we present the program’s estimated impact on the masses of multiple 
deprivations for five different poverty cut- offs: k � = 1,…, 5. For k � = 1 and k � = 2, 
the statistically significant reductions in masses are 0.024 and 0.026 points, or 6 
percent and 7.6 percent, respectively. In both cases, these reductions are driven 
by decreases in the corresponding intensities. A potential reason for observing no 
changes in the incidences may be the prevalent deprivation for the savings indica-
tor. For k � = 3, however, the statistically significant reduction in M ′ is 0.041 points 
(or 19.5 percent) and is accompanied by 5.8 percentage points reduction in the 
incidence. Even for k � = 4, both M ′ and H ′ decrease significantly by around 27 
percent. Thus, the 4Ps improved the overall masses and distribution of multiple 
deprivations.
To check the robustness of our findings, we compute the intent- to- treat esti-
mates for the sample of 243 households with eligible members in all five indicators 
(Supplementary Table A8) as well as the treatment- on- treated estimates using the 
information on actual beneficiary status (Supplementary Table A9). Our findings 
are consistent with these additional estimates.
6. IS the reductIon In poVerty Shared by the pooreSt?
Our findings in Section 4 show that the 4Ps, during our study period, did not 
seem to induce behavioral changes among those with four to five noncompliances. 
Section 5 results, however, show that the 4Ps, for the same period, improved the dis-
tribution of multiple deprivations. These findings raise certain questions. Are the 
households with four to five noncompliances the poorest among the beneficiary 
households? Is the overall reduction in multiple deprivations shared by those with 
four to five noncompliances?
First, we explore whether the households with four to five noncompliances 
are associated with experiencing more deprivations, on average, than the rest of 
the households. For convenience, we denote the multiple noncompliance score of 
household i by c∗
i
∈ [0, 5] and define a binary variable T45
i
, such that T45
i
= 1 if  
c∗
i
≥ 4 and T45
i
= 0 otherwise. We use the following linear regression specification 
to explore the association:
where y0
i
 is the outcome of interest for household i and 0 estimates the difference 
in the averages of the outcome variable between those with four to five noncom-
pliances and the rest of the households. Given that we are interested in the differ-
ence between the two groups before the intervention, the estimates are based only 
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We report the estimated differences in outcomes, ̂0, in Table 9, where the 
interpretations of its components are the same as that in Table 5. In the top half  
of the table, the ̂0 values reflect the differences in deprivation incidences for the 
five selected indicators. The households experiencing four to five noncompliances 
appear to be more deprived in all five indicators, but the differences are larger and 
statistically significant for the consumption and dropout indicators. Although sta-
tistically insignificant, the deprivation incidences in the hunger and underweight 
indicators are around 23– 28 percent higher for households experiencing four to 
five noncompliances.
Meanwhile, the bottom half  of the table presents the differences in the masses 
of deprivations (M ′) for all five poverty cut- offs, k � = 1,…, 5. We observe signifi-
cantly lower masses for the households experiencing three or less noncompliances. 
For k � = 1,…, 4, the estimated differences are between 0.193 and 0.268 points. 
Even for k � = 5, the estimated difference is 0.074 points. Thus, households with 
four to five noncompliances are associated with experiencing more extensive multi-
dimensional poverty, on average, than the rest of the beneficiary households.
Now, the question is whether these poorer households benefited from the 
overall positive impact, albeit of small magnitude, of the 4Ps. We may answer this 
question by strictly focusing on the households that experience four to five non-
compliances and examine the impact of the 4Ps within this group. This exercise, 
however, is not straightforward because selection to this group is determined after 
program assignment and the impact estimates may be subject to selection bias. For 
instance, affiliation to this group may be affected by both program eligibility, such 
as whether a household has at least one child or one pregnant member, and various 
supply- side factors, such as the availability of schools and health care centers.
TABLE 9  
comparISon of deprIVatIonS between houSeholdS wIth four to fIVe noncomplIanceS and the 
reSt of elIgIble houSeholdS
Consumption Hunger Underweight Dropout Savings
̂0 0.223*** 0.041 0.093 0.400*** 0.061
[0.143, 0.304] [−0.058, 0.139] [−0.002, 0.189] [0.309, 0.490] [−0.017, 0.138]
(0.458) (0.177) (0.329) (0.246) (0.861)
⟨649 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩ ⟨349 ⟩ ⟨635 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩
Comparison of the joint distribution of deprivations in terms of (M ′ )
k
� = 1 k � = 2 k � = 3 k � = 4 k � = 5
̂0 0.193*** 0.236*** 0.268*** 0.197*** 0.074**
[0.147, 0.238] [0.184, 0.288] [0.194, 0.343] [0.128, 0.267] [0.019, 0.130]
(0.380) (0.318) (0.182) (0.066) (0.007)
⟨649 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩ ⟨649 ⟩
Notes: Estimates are based on control households in Sample A. A block of four rows presents the 
results for each outcome. In each column and in the first row in each block, ̂0 denotes the difference in 
the averages of each outcome between the households with 4- 5 non- compliances and the households 
with 0- 3 non- compliances. For each estimate, we show the the 90% confidence interval (square brack-
ets), the mean outcome of the households with 0- 3 non- compliances (parenthesis), and the number of 
observations (angular brackets). Baseline control variables include household head’s age and completed 
years of education and household size. Additional village- level controls (from the impact evaluation but 
not baseline survey) are the numbers of grade- and high schools. All regressions control for municipal-
ity level fixed effects and standard errors are robust to clustering at the village level. M ′ ranges between 
0 and 1. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Source: Authors’ own computations.
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To attenuate such bias, we use the Heckman sample selection procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). Based on Equation 4, the multiple noncompliance scores may 
be estimated as:
where pi is the binary program assignment and i is the error term. Note that 
T45
i
= 1 whenever c∗
i
= 1 + 1pi + xi + i ≥ 4. Therefore, the relevant sample selec-









= 1 − 4.
The program’s impact on outcomes (deprivation incidences and masses of 
multiple deprivations) among households experiencing four to five noncompli-
ances is estimated by the following regression specification:
where y45
i
 is the outcome variable for household i such that T45
i
= 1, 45 is the coef-
ficient for the program assignment variable pi, x
1
i
 is a vector of covariates, and ui is 
the error term. The error terms i in Equation 9 and ui in Equation 10 are assumed 
to follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, standard deviations 
 and u, and correlation . If  ̂ = 0, then there is no sample selection problem 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 805), and the impact may be independently estimated by 
Equation 10. However, if  ̂ ≠ 0, then there is a sample selection problem and the 
impact should be estimated jointly by Equations 9 and 10.
Because we use the program assignment variable pi in the sample selection 
Equation 9 and also in Equation 10, the program’s impact on each outcome among 
those experiencing four to five noncompliances cannot simply be estimated by 
̂45. Instead, it should be estimated by ̂45 = ̂45 + h ( ̂, ̂, ̂u, ̂
�
1
, ̂1, ̂ ), where h is a 
function of the estimated parameters from both equations. For the functional form 
of h( ⋅ ), refer to Hoffmann and Kassouf (2005, Eq. 7).
We present our findings in Table 10, where the top- half  reports the estimated 
impact on the deprivation incidences of five indicators, and the bottom- half  shows 
the estimated impact on the masses of multiple deprivations. A negative estimate 
indicates that the poorer households benefited from the program. In fact, if  the 
estimates are larger in magnitudes compared to the corresponding estimates in 
Table 8, then the impact would appear to be relatively favorable to the poorest of 
the poor. Interpretations of the components in the table are the same as that in 
Table 5, and each curly bracket reports the p- value for the Wald test of the null 
hypothesis ̂ = 0 (a rejection confirms the existence of sample selection problem). 
Detailed results of both the selection regression and the outcome regression are 
available in Supplementary Tables A10 and A11.
The consumption and savings indicators improved among households experi-
encing four to five noncompliances. The 4Ps induced 19 and 7.8 percentage points 
reductions in the deprivation incidences for consumption and savings, respectively. 
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These two magnitudes are, in fact, substantially larger than the corresponding 
magnitudes of impact estimates in Table 8. Although the program did not induce 
behavioral changes among the poorer households enough to hurdle the condition-
alities, it successfully improved their consumption and saving behavior.
The deprivation incidences in hunger and dropout appear to have deteriorated 
among the poorer households, albeit statistically insignificantly. The result on the 
dropout indicator, in particular, is unsatisfactory because the program induced 8.8 
percentage points reduction in the overall incidence of deprivation (Table 8).
Finally, we examine the program’s impact on the masses of multiple depriva-
tions or multidimensional poverty. From Table 8 we already observe that the overall 
masses for k � = 1, 2, 3, 4 decreased statistically significantly by 0.024– 0.041 points. 
Among the households with four to five noncompliances in Table 10, however, we 
only observe a marginally larger (0.037– 0.056 points) but statistically insignificant 
estimated reduction in the corresponding masses for k = 1, 2. Therefore, we observe 
that the 4Ps is not sufficiently inclusive in terms of reducing poverty and depriva-
tions among the poorest of the poor.
TABLE 10  
eStImateS of 4pS’ Impact on deprIVatIonS among houSeholdS experIencIng four to fIVe 
noncomplIanceS, controllIng for Sample SelectIon
Consumption Hunger Underweight† Dropout Savings
̂45 −0.190** 0.075 −0.022 0.034 −0.078**
[−0.319, −0.061] [−0.067, 0.216] [−0.242, 0.197] [−0.156, 0.224] [−0.140, −0.016]
{0.508} {0.281} {0.000} {0.752} {0.824}
(0.667) (0.263) (0.456) (0.684) (0.912)
⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨716 ⟩ ⟨1, 266 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩
Impact on the joint- distribution of deprivations (M ′ )
k
� = 1 k � = 2 k � = 3 k � = 4 k � = 5
̂45 - 0.037 - 0.056 - 0.024 0.041 - 0.048
[−0.108, 0.034] [−0.144, 0.032] [−0.130, 0.082] [−0.086, 0.169] [−0.115, 0.019]
{0.007} {0.053} {0.060} {0.000} {0.244}
(0.596) (0.582) (0.498) (0.298) (0.088)
⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩ ⟨1, 290 ⟩
Notes: A block of five rows presents the results for each outcome. In each column and in the first 
row in each block, ̂45 denotes the program’s impact among households with 4- 5 non- compliances in 
terms of the marginal effect conditional on c ∗
i
≥ 4 computed by the maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) method. For each impact estimate, we show the 90% confidence interval (square brackets), the 
p- value for the Wald test for rejecting the null hypothesis of ̂ = 0, where a rejection confirms the exist-
ence of sample selection (curly brackets), the control mean (parentheses), and the number of observa-
tions (angular brackets). Control variables for the selection equation (9) include program assignment, 
the number of program- eligible members at baseline, whether a household has at least one 0– 2- year- old 
member, whether a household has at least one 3– 5- year- old member, whether a household has at least 
one pregnant member, household head’s age and completed years of education, and village level char-
acteristics from the impact evaluation survey (not baseline)— the number of grade- and high schools, 
number of doctors and midwives, and the presence of a health center in the village. Control variables for 
Equation 10 include the number of household members at baseline, whether a household has a pregnant 
member, household head’s age and completed years of education, and village level variables— the num-
bers of grade- and high schools. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects and standard errors 
are robust to clustering at the village level. M ′ range between 0 and 1. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own computations. † The MLE process had convergence problems and we use the two- 
step Heckman estimation process instead. The p- value in the curly bracket corresponds to the t- test for 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio is zero.
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7. concludIng remarkS
Our key objective in this paper is to formalize a multidimensional evaluation 
framework and empirically show that a causal evaluation exercise that incorporates 
the joint distribution of outcome is superior to conventional evaluation exercises. 
When the program in consideration addresses multiple disadvantages, improve-
ments in a number of targeted outcomes evaluated separately may not be enough 
to fulfill the United Nations’ pledge of “leave no one behind.”
Thus, the question we tried to address is: Do anti- poverty programs reach 
beneficiaries that require assistance in multiple outcomes simultaneously? From a 
policy perspective, if  these beneficiaries appear to be left out by the program, an 
immediate action point is to find out the reasons and reformulate the program’s 
components.
We use the well- known counting framework (Atkinson, 2003; Alkire and 
Foster, 2011) for evaluating changes in the distribution of multiple outcomes. We 
then apply the framework to evaluate the impact of the Philippine CCT program— 
called Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)— on beneficiary households 
between 2009 and 2011, using the first wave of randomized control trial survey 
embedded within the program.
Our empirical investigation reveals that 4Ps cash grants induced targeted 
behavioral changes among beneficiaries with fewer noncompliances, but those 
with a larger number of simultaneous noncompliances appear to have been left 
out. We further find out that, on average, the beneficiaries with more noncompli-
ances experience more extensive deprivations as well. Although 4Ps reduced their 
consumption and savings deprivation, we find no conclusive evidence that they 
benefited from the overall poverty reduction. Previous evaluation studies on the 
4Ps may have found satisfactory results in improving targeted outcomes separately, 
but our results show that program enhancements are needed to fulfill the UN 
pledge of “leave no one behind.”
Our findings suggest that for the poorest families, the cash grants may only be 
enough to marginally improve their consumption, but are not sufficient to allevi-
ate other associated deprivations. This particular observation calls for the need to 
specifically examine how poorer families manage program compliances as well as 
the required complementary interventions to ensure that they are not left behind.
Our results also highlight that improvements in each noncompliance matter in 
the ability of households to reduce their masses of multiple noncompliances, sug-
gesting that impacts may be amplified if  program components specifically address 
each noncompliance.
Currently, the education grant is targeted so that each child receives a grant 
to induce school attendance. The health grant is broad in that all households get 
the same amount, but the conditionalities they must satisfy depend on household 
composition. At the minimum, the household grantee needs to attend a monthly 
community meeting to qualify for the health grant. If  the household happens to 
have a pregnant member or a 0- to 5- year- old child, it needs to satisfy all the rel-
evant conditionalities (pre- and postnatal check- ups, facility- based delivery, and 
child weight monitoring) on top of the monthly meeting for the same health grant. 
If  the program can develop levers to induce compliance to each of the health 
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
26
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
conditionalities, then a household with a larger number of simultaneous noncom-
pliances may be better equipped to reduce their noncompliances, which can set 
them toward a path of reduced mass of noncompliances. One starting point thus is 
to consider adjusting the health grants based on household composition.
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